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From Inflation to Deflation: A Novel
Experience for Hong Kong
To speed up its economic recovery, the Special Administrative Region is
betting on a more intense economic integration with mainland China
Peter Chiu
1 Hong Kong’s economy has gone from one of high inflation in the early 1990s into one of
high deflation after the Asian financial crisis.  Over the past five years,  product and
property prices, rents and wages have all been adjusted downwards. Both the investors
and the government have been taken by surprise.  Residential  property prices  have
fallen 65%. Many who bought properties at high prices are now suffering heavy capital
losses.  The  government  is  facing  decreasing  revenues  through  a  slowing-down  of
economic activities and has been suffering heavy budget deficits. 
2 The effect  of  price  level  changes  on the  standard of  living,  in  principle,  should be
neutral, assuming that a person has no assets or debts and relies solely on his income
for survival. If his income and the prices of the goods he buys increase both by 10%, he
is no better or worse off. However such a case is rare. People usually possess assets such
as property and incur debts such as mortgage loans. In times of inflation property-
owners  gain as  the value of  their  properties  increase  while  their  debts  are  a  fixed
amount. In times of deflation they lose as the value of their properties decreases while
their debts are still a fixed amount.
3 Businessmen normally  benefit  in  times  of  inflation.  They  find  the  prices  of  their
products increasing faster than the salaries they pay to their employees. However the
reverse is true in times of deflation and they suffer when the prices of their products
falling faster than the salaries they have to pay out. This explains why businesses were
generally profitable during the period of inflation of the early 1990s and why so many
firms have had to close down in period of the deflation following the Asian financial
crisis.
4 Most  wage  earners  suffer  in  times  of  inflation.  But  deflation  gives  them  greater
purchasing power. Provided they keep their jobs, they benefit from deflation. Inflation
is usually accompanied by a rate of low unemployment and vice versa for deflation.
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While people complain about price increases when inflation rises they still have jobs
and money to spend. Deflation brings job losses, despite falling prices.
5 Economic  theory  tells  us  that  inflation  can  be  restrained  by  a  policy  to  allow  the
domestic currency to appreciate and deflation can be mitigated by a policy to allow the
domestic currency to depreciate. However while the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the
US dollar at a fixed rate of US$1:HK$7.8, as it is currently under the linked rate system
adopted since October 19831, this will not occur in Hong Kong.
6 Economic theory also tells us that inflation can be restrained by a policy to reduce
money supply through raising interest rates and deflation can be mitigated by a policy
to increase money supply through a reduction in interest rates. However, under the
linked rate system, interest rates in Hong Kong have to follow the interest rates in the
United States. In other words, no discretionary monetary policy can be employed to
tackle the problems of inflation and deflation in Hong Kong. However there is a self-
adjustment  mechanism inherent  in  the  linked rate  system.  When there  is  inflation
exports will fall. The fall in exports will lead to lower employment and lower inflation.
When there  is  deflation  exports  will  increase.  The  increase  in  exports  will  lead  to
higher employment and lower deflation. 
7 In the United States and the United Kingdom, price levels have been quite stable since
1991 (see Figure 1). Both countries have been pursuing a policy to keep price levels
stable through interest rate changes. When inflation is high, interest rates will rise.
When inflation is low, interest rates will drop. At present the United States is
experiencing slow economic growth accompanied by low inflation, and has, therefore,
reduced its interest rates to an all-time low, i.e. a prime rate of 5%. Recently there has
also been the worry that the United States may fall into deflation. 
8 Japan, China and Hong Kong have all experienced deflation to various extents in recent
years. Both Japan and Hong Kong have suffered slow economic growth in recent years
accompanied by deflation. However China also has been under deflationary pressure
despite its rapid economic growth began. This phenomenon is usually explained by the
fact  that  a  substantial  part  of  China’s  growth  is  generated  by  the  government’s
spending on infrastructure, while demand in the market has remained sluggish. 
9 Hong  Kong  experienced  exceptionally  high  inflation  in  the  early  1990s  and
exceptionally high deflation more recently. As mentioned earlier under the linked rate
system, Hong Kong is unable to employ an exchange rate policy for the adjustment of
its economy. Hence adjustment is mainly reflected in its price level, i.e. inflation and
deflation.
10 The traditional explanation of inflation has been excess demand. When demand in the
market is in excess of supply, prices are bid up. When the world economy experienced
inflationary  pressure  in  the  1970s  and  late  1980s,  concerns  now  address  more  the
suppression  of  demand.  However  the  world  economy  is  currently  faced  with  the
possibility  of  deflation.  The  demand  explanation  alone  may  not  be  adequate  in
explaining this.
11 Deflation is now regarded mainly as the result of excess supply. The rapid progress in
information technology now extensively employed in the manufacturing and services
sectors,  has  become a  major  factor  for  the  fall  in  production  costs  and  hence  the
increase in supply. Another explanation of deflation is the rapid increase in production
as a result of some developing countries establishing a market economy, such as China
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and countries in Eastern Europe. These countries, endowed with abundant labour, are
now able to pour out cheap products.
12 Under the linked rate system Hong Kong’s inflation rate should theoretically follow
that of the United States. If it does not, an adjustment process will take place which will
eventually  equalise  the inflation rates  in both.  Suppose Hong Kong currently has a
much higher inflation rate than the United States. Then Hong Kong goods will be less
competitive than US goods in face of the outside world. Consequently Hong Kong is less
able  to  obtain  orders  from  other  countries.  The  decrease  in  exports  will  have  a
contractionary effect on the economy. Eventually inflation will slow down. 
13 When the linked rate system was set up it was expected that Hong Kong’s inflation rate
would follow that of the United States. However it turned out that the relationship only
remains  a  theoretical  long-run equilibrium relationship and in  the short  run there
could be forces that would cause the inflation rate to deviate in the two places. If Hong
Kong was sufficiently near to the United States and is producing goods similar to those
produced in the United States, any deviation of inflation rates in the two places would
activate the above adjustment process. However Hong Kong is geographically so far
away from the United States and Hong Kong is producing goods so different from those
produced  in  the  United  States.  Furthermore  Hong  Kong  is  economically  so  much
influenced  by  mainland  China,  which  is  experiencing  a  rapid  rate  of  economic
development. So there is no reason to expect that in the short term Hong Kong’s rate of
inflation should follow that in the United States.
14 Besides being located geographically  far  away from the United States,  Hong Kong’s
economic structure is also different from that of the United States. The United States is
a mature economy with a high level of technology, whereas Hong Kong is basically an
entrepôt and a commercial  centre.  The factors that affect  price level  in the United
States are not those affecting price levels in Hong Kong. A rise in oil prices is a major
factor for inflation in the United States. But in Hong Kong this may be less important
than an increase in demand for Hong Kong re-export and commercial services. 
15 Inflation in Hong Kong in the early 1990s and the deflation after the Asian financial
crisis should be viewed in the context of the linked rate system. In this paper we first
review the causes of Hong Kong’s high inflation in the early 1990s, then examine the
causes of Hong Kong’s deflation after the crisis. Finally we discuss how Hong Kong’s
economy adjusts to inflation and deflation under the linked rate system. 
The causes of inflation in Hong KongStructural change
16 John Greenwood maintained that Hong Kong’s high inflation in the early 1990s was due
mainly  to  structural  change  that  took  place  in  Hong  Kong.  His  argument  runs  as
follows. After China adopted the open door policy Hong Kong gradually went through a
structural change. Many manufacturers began to shift their production into mainland
China.  From 1991  to  2001,  the  number  of  employed  persons  in  manufacturing  has
decreased  by  half  whereas  the  number  of  employed  persons  in  other  industries,
especially  in  finance,  insurance,  real  estate  and  business  services  have  increased
rapidly (see Table 2). At the same time the rapid economic development of China has
resulted  in  great  demand  for  Hong  Kong’s  commercial  and financial  services.  This
increased demand pushed up professional salaries (see Table 3) and rents of business
premises. The inflation rate therefore started to rise2. 
Negative real interest rate 
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17 The  negative  real  interest  rates  seen  in  Hong  Kong  in  the  early  1990s  have  been
regarded as another cause of Hong Kong’s inflation (see Table 4)3. As mentioned earlier,
under the linked rate system Hong Kong interest rates automatically follow US interest
rates.  Throughout the 1990s US interest rates stayed quite stable at  around 5% per
annum. As a result Hong Kong interest rates also stayed around this level. 
18 For  most  of  the  early  1990s,  real  interest  rates  remained  negative.  People  were
encouraged to borrow money for investment.  Most  investments were in real  assets
such as properties, which in time of high inflation is a good hedge for inflation. When
property prices increased, rent also increased (see Table 5). Increase in rents in turn
forced up prices of outputs. So inflation that had been caused by structural change was
made more severe under the condition of negative interest rates. 
A weak Hong Kong dollar 
19 The HK dollar  link with the US dollar  implies  that  when the US dollar  depreciates
against other currencies, the HK dollar also depreciates against other currencies. Since
the mid-1980s until the mid-1990s the US dollar exchange value continued falling. In
the mid-1980s the value of the US dollar against the Japanese Yen was US$1=¥260. But
by the mid-1990s this value had already fallen to around US$1=¥100. The HK dollar also
depreciated against the yen to the same extent.  As Hong Kong had been importing
substantially  from  Japan,  the  result  was  a  rapid  rise  in  import  prices  exerting
inflationary pressure on Hong Kong. 
20 There was strong criticism of the linked rate system and critics advocated linking the
HK dollar to a basket of currencies instead of to the US dollar alone. However a study
found that under the linked rate system pegging the Hong Kong dollar with a basket of
currencies  would  require  the  government  to  alter  the  official  exchange rate  of  7.8
occasionally. This would undermine confidence in the linked rate system. As a result
the Hong Kong government rejected the proposal and expressed its determination to
continue linking the HK dollar with the US dollar4.
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1. Evolution of  inflation 
NB: Figures for 2002 are preliminary estimates.
Sources: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various years. Hong Kong
Annual Digest of Statistics, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, various years.High government capital expenditures 
21 Another cause of Hong Kong’s inflation in the early 1990s was the high government
capital expenditure on infrastructure projects such as the new airport at Chek Lap Kok.
The airport was built on a piece of land reclaimed from the sea at Chek Lap Kok on
Lantau Island. The cost of building the new airport amounted to nearly HK$100 billion.
Such  a  heavy  injection  of  money  into  the  economy  inevitably  caused  inflationary
pressure. 
22 The policy of increasing capital expenditure was aimed at maintaining the confidence
of  investors  within  the  economy.  The  1997  issue  whereby  Hong  Kong  was  to  be
returned to China caused a tremendous loss of confidence in the Hong Kong economy.
The private sector was reluctant to invest resulting in huge capital outflow. With the
successful  signing  of  the  Sino-British  Agreement  in  1984  confidence  was  restored.
However  the  June  Fourth  event  that  took  place  in  Peking  in  1989  undermined
confidence once again. To maintain confidence in and the economic growth of Hong
Kong the government decided to construct the new airport at Chek Lap Kok .
23 The decision to construct a new airport did generate the expected effects. Confidence
was restored. Investments increased with substantial capital inflow to the economy.
Meanwhile  Hong  Kong  also  benefited  from  the  rapid  economic  development  of
mainland China. The huge capital expenditure of the government thus became a cause
of inflation rather than just a measure to maintain confidence and economic growth. 
24 With a rapidly increasing budget reserve brought about by the prosperous economy,
the  government  was  unable  politically  to  resist  the  demand  for  increasing  social
welfare  expenditure.  Also  government  departments  were  expanded  to  provide
improved services. In the 1980s government expenditure stood at around 18% of GDP.
But by the end of the 1990s this had already risen to around 23%. 
Low unemployment rate amid high inflation
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25 During the inflationary period of the early 1990s Hong Kong enjoyed real GDP growth
on average at 5% per annum. Also unemployment rates were maintained on average at
2% per annum. The growth rate was considered as high for mature economies as a
whole. The low unemployment rate was unmatched by other economies (see Figure 6). 
26 It was at this time that the property bubble began to form. The high demand for both
residential and business properties as a result of strong confidence in the economy and
negative  real  interest  rates  pushed up property  prices  quickly.  The  restricted  land
supply of only 50 hectares per year as agreed by the Sino-British Agreement further
pushed up property prices.  Speculation then followed which eventually inflated the
property bubble to its full size. When property prices reached their peak at end of 1997,
they were almost ten times higher than in the mid-1980s. A small residential flat of 500
square feet  commanded a  price  of  around HK$4 million,  which was the highest  by
world standards. 
27 During this period the unemployment rate stayed as low as 2% per annum on average.
This level is practically full employment taking into account of people changing jobs
and new graduates looking for jobs. There were in fact severe labour shortages during
this period. People tended to change jobs frequently with higher salaries in the new
jobs. Each week the South China Morning Post published nearly a hundred pages of job
advertisements. 
28 In July 1997 Hong Kong was handed back to China in a climate of high confidence and
ungrounded  economic  prosperity.  Hong  Kong  was  as  a  hen  that  laid  golden  eggs.
Backed by the fast developing mainland and being geographically located near to the
mainland, Hong Kong’s economic future was deemed incomparably brilliant.
The Asian financial crisis and the beginning of deflation
29 The essence of the Asian financial crisis in late 1997 was huge capital outflows from the
Asian region. South Korea and Indonesia were good examples: the financial systems of
these two countries collapsed and their currencies fell drastically. Hong Kong was lucky
enough not to be damaged seriously by the turmoil. The HK dollar was not affected due
to its link with the US dollar. No damage was done to its financial system which had
been  well  regulated  and  supervised.  However  a  process  of  painful  adjustment  was
inaugurated. 
30 Under the linked rate system there is no possibility of a devaluation. If the HK dollar
cannot be devalued, prices and wages have to adjust downwards. This is the process of
deflation. The relatively stronger value of the HK dollar as against its neighbouring
countries  results  in  reduced  competitiveness  of  Hong  Kong’s  exports  in  western
countries. Hong Kong exporters face low demand from overseas buyers. Prices have to
be lowered to cope with the reduced demand. Soon producers have to resort to cutting
wages. So a process of price and cost cutting inaugurated the process of deflation. This
process will continue until prices and wages have fallen enough to make Hong Kong
goods competitive again. So deflation is an adjustment mechanism under the linked
rate system when the currency is overvalued. 
31 One may ask why the government does  not  devalue the HK dollar.  To answer this
question we must examine why the linked rate system was set up initially. In 1982, then
British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher went to Peking and talked with the Chinese leader
Mr. Deng Xiaoping about the future of Hong Kong after the expiry of the lease of the
New Territories, the northern part of Hong Kong. It was announced that China, besides
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refusing to extend the lease of the New Territories, was to reclaim Hong Kong in 1997.
A confidence problem began to emerge. People began selling HK dollars for foreign
currencies. In September 1983 the value of the HK dollar fell to nearly US$1:HK$10 from
its normal level of HK$1:HK$6.5. To restore confidence in the HK dollar the government
decided to adopt the linked rate system.
32 Since then the government has been convinced that  the linked rate system is  best
suited for Hong Kong being a small economy without controls on capital movement. By
linking the HK dollar with a stable hard currency, the US dollar, exchange stability for
the  HK  dollar  can  be  achieved.  The  system  does  not  allow  for  devaluation  and
revaluation and depends solely on its automatic adjustment mechanism, i.e. adjustment
through inflation and deflation. This mechanism inherent in the system could be relied
upon  to  react  to  any  external  and  internal  economic  shocks.  If  devaluation  or
revaluation would cause some disturbance. It would also lead to currency speculation
and hence a lack of confidence again in the HK dollar. It is for this reason that the
government is determined to maintain the 7.8 exchange rate5.
Deflation as an adjustment
33 Deflation  manifests  itself  mainly  in  three  areas,  i.e.  prices  of  goods  and  services,
property prices and rent, and wages. Prices of goods and services have been falling in
the past few years. Negative inflation rates have occurred since 1999 (see Figure 6).
Properties prices have adjusted downward since 1997, and rents too (see Table 5). Wage
adjustments seem to lag behind rent and property price adjustments (see Table 3). This
seems  inconsistent  with  the  general  belief  that  wages  in  Hong  Kong  are  falling.
However we must bear in mind that in compiling these statistics no adjustment has
been made to take account of employees being laid off who had to find other jobs with
much lower salaries. The wage index only shows the change of wages for those who
have remained in their jobs. This is a statistical loophole that should be filled. 
34 As long as Hong Kong remains in the linked rate system, adjustment of the economy
will have to be made through either inflation or deflation. Tony Latter, Deputy Chief
Executive  of  the  Hong  Kong  Monetary  Authority  (HKMA),  at  a  conference  jointly
organised by the representative offices of Asian central banks in London and the Bank
of England’s Centre for Central Banking Studies, held at the Bank of England on June
12th 2001, made this clear6:  “This adjustment process may imply either inflation or
deflation, which may be at rates outside the bounds which would typically be set by an
economy operating with inflation targeting. For instance, since the mid-1990s Hong
Kong’s 12-month rate of consumer price inflation has been as high as 10% and as low as
minus 6%. Although this is a much wider range than experienced in the United States,
… the peg itself serves a sort of insurance against excessive movements—of the nature
of  hyper-inflation  or  an  intense  spiral  of  deflation—because  at  some  point
competitiveness will be sufficiently curtailed or enhanced to halt the process”. 
35 Tony Latter however has the view that the linked rate system is best suited for Hong
Kong for the following reasons. Hong Kong possesses the necessary conditions for the
operation of the linked rate system, namely, sufficiently flexible costs and prices,  a
sound banking system, adequate fiscal discipline and the requisite foreign exchange
reserves to back the monetary base. According to Tony Latter, deflation that emerges
now  in  Hong  Kong  does  not  present  a  great  problem,  as  it  can  be  self-adjusted.
Therefore there is no reason to abandon the linked rate system 7. 
The effect of economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China 
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36 The Hong Kong and mainland Chinese economies have been linked since 1979 when
China began its open-door policy. This has led to structural change in Hong Kong. It has
also become a cause for Hong Kong’s deflation8. As more Hong Kong people go to the
mainland for business,  there is a tendency among them to buy residential property
there, especially in Shenzhen. Property prices in the mainland are very attractive to
Hong Kong people. The average purchase price for a flat in Hong Kong can buy several
flats of the same size in Shenzhen. Many people who are unable to buy flats in Hong
Kong are buying flats in Shenzhen for retirement. Others buy them for holidays. The
amount  of  money  flowing  into  the  mainland  via  property  purchase  is  therefore
substantial. This has been regarded as one of the reasons for the reduced demand for
properties in Hong Kong and the resulting drop in property prices.
37 Economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China also has a deflationary
effect on Hong Kong’s prices. Prices of goods and services in the mainland are much
lower than those in Hong Kong. As a result there is the tendency for Hong Kong people
to  go  into  China,  especially  into  Shenzhen,  during  holidays  and weekends.  In  long
holiday periods such as Christmas, Chinese New Year and Easter, more than one million
Hong Kong people cross the border. This has become one of the reasons for the low
consumption within Hong Kong, and hits the retail industry hard. Unless retailers
reduce their prices, there is little chance of competing with their counterparts in the
mainland.  However,  this  situation  is  expected  to  improve  with  the  consent  of  the
mainland government to allow more mainlanders to travel to Hong Kong. 
 
2. Evolution of employment in some sectors (thousand persons)
Source : Table 2.6, Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, Census and Statistics Department, Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, 2002.
38 Economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China also has a deflationary
effect on Hong Kong’s wages. As mentioned earlier, manufacturers have been shifting
their  production process into the mainland.  This  has put pressure on wages in the
manufacturing  sector.  In  recent  years,  there  is  also  the  tendency  for  Hong  Kong’s
service providers to move part of their servicing process into mainland China. With the
development of communications technology, it is now possible to relocate some parts
of the servicing process to the mainland—some Hong Kong banks have moved their
data  processing units,  while  a  number of  mobile  telephone companies  have moved
their customer service units. The consequence is the reduction of job opportunities in
Hong Kong and a fall in wages. 
39 The deflationary effects of economic integration between Hong Kong and the mainland
are not a surprise. Economic theory has long pointed out this possibility. The Theorem
of “Equalisation of Factor Prices” has predicted such a result 9. 
40 Joseph Yam, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has also
pointed  out  that  deflation  in  Hong  Kong  is  due  to  two  factors,  namely,  the  slow
economic growth of the world economy and the increasing integration of the Hong
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Kong economy with that of the mainland 10: “The increasing integration, coupled to the
starting  point  of  huge  discrepancies  in  prices  and  wages,  consigns  Hong  Kong  to
deflation and the near mainland to inflation over time. This will in theory go on until
the differentials have been arbitraged away to equilibrium levels, although in view of
the significant differences under “one country, two systems”, and the limitations in the
flow of labour and capital, this does not necessarily mean price equalisation. In fact, the
arbitrage process has already been operative for over twenty years, as the mainland
embarked on the road of reform and liberalisation in earnest. It is just that the process
has been accelerated in recent years.” 
41 Hong Kong’s deflation is an adjustment process under the linked rate system for the
regaining of lost competitiveness and the consequence of its economic integration with
mainland  China.  Viewed  as  such  there  is  no  short-term  solution  to  Hong  Kong’s
deflation. What Hong Kong can do is to mitigate the effects of deflation and seek ways
through increased productivity to raise it competitiveness and speed up its economic
recovery.
Efforts to speed up Hong Kong’s recovery
42 The  reliance  on  deflation  for  restoring  Hong  Kong’s  competitiveness  is  a  painful
process. Efforts must be made to speed up Hong Kong’s economic recovery. Deflation is
not only having its effects on prices and wages, it has brought about disastrous effects
for  property  owners,  business  enterprises  and  also  the  government.  Residential
property prices have dropped by nearly 65% since 1997. Many properties have become
“negative assets” with their asset values much lower than their liabilities (the loans to
the banks).  Many people lost  their  jobs during the economic downturn and had to
declare bankruptcy. Bankruptcy cases have increased in recent years. 
43 Deflation has also caused hardship to business enterprises. With dropping demand on
goods and services, it is increasingly difficult for business enterprises to maintain their
profits.  Share  prices  have  dropped  by  half  since  1997.  With  reduced  profits  many
business enterprises have resorted to downsizing their operations, laying off staff and
cutting wages. These explain for the high rate of unemployment in recent years (7% in
2002, see Figure 6)
44 Government revenue is  also adversely affected by deflation.  Due to a slow-down in
economic activities, government revenue has decreased considerably. At the same time
government expenditure on unemployment benefits have increased. These have led to
the government facing substantial  budget deficits  in the past few years.  In the last
financial year (2002/3) the budget deficit reached more than HK$70 billion being about
6% of Hong Kong’s GDP. 
45 Under the current conditions of service it is difficult for the government to cut the
salary of civil servants in line with deflation. In the past when inflation took place the
salaries  of  civil  servants  were adjusted upwards for  inflation.  However,  there is  no
provision for downward adjustment of salaries when deflation takes place. In the last
financial  year (2002/3) the government was under heavy public pressure as well  as
budgetary  need  to  cut  civil  service  salaries,  but  faced  strong  opposition  from civil
servants. Eventually the government had to resort to an amendment of the relevant
employment law so as to make the salary cut of 4.5% legal. 
46 There is another difficulty for the government in respect of salary cuts. The Basic Law
provides that the conditions of service of civil servants should not worsen after the
handover of Hong Kong to China. This amounts to saying that the maximum salary cut
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in the future is a further cut of 6%, reducing the salary level of civil servants back to
1997 levels. It has been announced recently by the government that an agreement has
been reached between the government and the civil servants that salaries will be cut in
two stages by a total of 6%. The first cut of 3% will be effective from January 2004 and
the second cut of another 3% will be effective from January 2005. It is estimated that
the government can thus save HK$7 billion per year.
47 Another problem similar in nature has occurred in the pricing policy of utilities such as
electricity, gas and transport. In times of inflation, these companies had the right to
apply for upward adjustment of charges to cope with inflation. In times of deflation,
they naturally will not take the initiative to apply for a reduction in charges. There is
no provision for the government to force these companies to reduce their charges. This
surely generates unfairness for consumers, who have to bear the burden of salary cuts
during deflation but cannot benefit from a reduction in charges. To tackle this problem
the government is now trying to construct new formulae whereby such charges can be
increased/decreased in line with inflation/deflation.
 
3. Salary indices for managerial and professional employees
NB: These salary indices concern the major economic sectors following: manufacturing, electricity
and gas; building and construction, and related trades; wholesale, retail and import/export trades;
transport, storage and communications; ﬁnancial institutions and insurance. 
Figures for 2002 are preliminary estimates.
Source: Table 2.14, Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 2002.
48 At end of 2002 the government introduced measures to put a halt to falling property
prices. These measures aimed mainly at reducing the supply of land. In times of falling
property prices, buyers tend to postpone their purchases hoping to be able to buy at
lower prices later. If there is a sign that property prices will not drop further, buyers
will regain confidence and enter the market. 
49 This, no doubt, is intervention by the government in the residential property market.
Critics see the intervention as unnecessary as they think that the market will adjust by
itself.  They also see that if  Hong Kong’s  price levels,  including property prices and
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rents, can come down more quickly back to a level in line with economic fundamentals,
economic recovery will take place sooner. However the view of the government is that
property  prices  have  fallen  to  an  unreasonably  low  level  due  to  people’s  loss  of
confidence in the property market, and that something must be done to put things in
order. Moreover, the government has announced additional new measures to stimulate
demand in the property market. 
50 Despite the deflationary effects brought about by the economic integration between
Hong Kong and mainland China, the government now regards more intense economic
integration as a long-term strategy for maintaining Hong Kong’s economic growth. This
approach is reflected in the policy speech of Mr. Tung Chee-hwa, the Chief Executive of
the Hong Kong Special  Administration Region,  delivered in January 2003.  Mr.  Tung
identified more intense economic integration with mainland China, especially with the
Pearl River Delta (PRD) region, as the most effective measure to speed up Hong Kong’s
economic growth 11.
51 With  the  entry  of  China  into  the  WTO,  Hong  Kong’s  importance  as  a  middleman
between mainland China and the outside world has diminished. Now mainland Chinese
enterprises can deal directly with the outside world. So Hong Kong must find other
ways to participate in China business. In its policy speech Mr. Tung identified certain
areas where Hong Kong can be of benefit to China: logistics, financial services, business
services  and  tourism.  Excellence  in  these  areas  will  maintain  Hong  Kong  as  an
important  city  in  the  PRD  region.  Backed  by  the  well-developed  infrastructure,
financial  and judicial  systems, it  is  hoped that Hong Kong will  become the location
where  mainland Chinese  companies  as  well  as  international  companies  will  station
their head offices. 
52 What fiscal policy and monetary policy can Hong Kong employ to tackle deflation? As
Hong Kong is in the linked rate system, there is no means of carrying out monetary
policy. As to fiscal policy, there is not much that the government can do. As mentioned
earlier, the government has run into heavy budget deficits in recent years. Instead of
increasing  its  spending  the  government  is  now  trying  every  means to  cut  its
expenditure in order to balance its budget. 
53 There  have  been proposals  for  the  government  to  issue  bonds  to  make up for  the
budget deficit and to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy. However the government is
reluctant to do so. One major reason is that the successful operation of the linked rate
system  relies  on  the  confidence  of  investors  in  the  financial  strength  of  the
government.  If  confidence  is  lost  as  a  result  of  the  government  incurring  debts,
substantial capital outflow will take place, which will cause systemic instability. As the
government is still in possession of substantial budget reserves, it does not think there
is an immediate need to issue bonds. 
 
4. Negative real interest rates
NB: Interest rate is represented by 3 months inter-bank rate. Figures for 2002 are preliminary
estimates. 
Sources: Table 10.15 and table 11.1, Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 2002.
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54 However the issue can be viewed in another way. Issuing bonds does not necessarily
mean the government financing its deficit through debt. It is a way to “buy time” to
improve its budget position. With additional resources in hand the government can
more effectively support the linked rate system in case it  is  disturbed by a sudden
capital outflow. This, in turn, would raise confidence in the linked rate system. In the
meantime, the government can have more time and flexibility to engineer its remedial
measures to improve its budget.
55 Economic recovery seemed to appear in the fourth quarter of 2002 as exports started to
increase again. This trend continued in the first quarter of 2003. However, the outbreak
of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in March 2003 practically brought the
economic recovery of Hong Kong to a complete halt. The unemployment rate increased
again,  with  the  figure  for  May 2003  shooting up to  8.3%.  In  spite  of  heavy budget
deficits the government finds it necessary to put forth a rescue plan of about twelve
billion HK dollars to stimulate domestic consumption. As a result of combined efforts
by  the  government,  the  people  of  Hong  Kong  and  the  World  Health  Organisation
(WHO), SARS has come under control.
56 Hong Kong’s  economic problems are certainly of  concern for the mainland Chinese
government.  Keeping Hong Kong prosperous economically after the handover is  an
important policy of the central government. One way to help Hong Kong out of the
present economic problems is to allow Hong Kong more scope in participating in the
economic development of Mainland China. In late June 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao, came
to Hong Kong and chaired the signing of the so-called “Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement”  (CEPA).  The  agreement  grants  zero  tariffs  to  manufactured  goods
produced in Hong Kong. Also a number of professional services such as accountants,
lawyers, architects, conference organisers, property agencies, etc. are allowed to run
their own businesses in the mainland. It is expected that these privileges will help to
provide job opportunities and to speed up Hong Kong’s economic recovery.
57 The development of  the external  economic environment is  also favourable to Hong
Kong. Now that the Iraq war is over it is expected that the world economy will improve.
Oil  prices  are  expected to  stay  low,  again  providing  conditions  for  world  economy
recovery. Increase in the growth of the world economy will then provide more export
and re-export opportunities for Hong Kong. Furthermore the US dollar has recently
weakened with beneficial effects on Hong Kong’s exports under the linked rate system.
58 On July 1st 2003, half a million Hong Kong people took to the street protesting against
the proposed anti-subversion law to  be  made in  accordance with the  provisions  of
Article 23 of the Basic Law. The issue has both political and economic implications. On
the political front, Hong Kong people see the law as a threat to civil liberties. The law
required Hong Kong to ban groups that are also outlawed in mainland China, to let
security police conduct searches without warrants, and to bar exposure of China’s state
secrets  without  a  public-interest  defence.  With  the  resignation of  James  Tien from
Tung’s Executive Council and Tien’s declaration that he and his fellow political party
members would not support the proposal of the law during Legislative Council debate,
Tung had to announce postponement of the debate. 
59 On the economic front, the great number of people taking to the street is due, not only
to their aspiration for civil liberties, but to their dissatisfaction at the poor economic
condition of Hong Kong. People are now unable to tolerate the high unemployment
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rate,  the  deflationary  pressure,  the  loss  of  their  property  values,  the  proposed tax
increases, and the proposed cuts in government expenditure. These sentiments were
clearly shown in the slogans these people carried during the protest, such as “We need
work opportunities”,  “Away  with  negative  assets”,  “No  more  salary  cuts”  etc.  So
something needs to be done. 
 
5. The property bubble
NB: Figures for 2002 are preliminary estimates.
Sources : Tables 7.15, 7.17 et 7.18, Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 2002.
60 The mainland Chinese government offered Hong Kong support. In early August 2003
the  Hong  Kong-Guangdong  Co-operation  Joint  Conference  was  held  in  Hong  Kong
chaired  by  Mr.  Tung  Chee-hwa  and  Mr.  Huang  Huahua,  the  Guangdong  province
governor. Guangdong was to allow more people to travel to Hong Kong. Initially people
of four cities, namely, Dongguan, Foshan, Jiangmen and Zhongshan, were allowed to
travel to Hong Kong on an individual basis (previously they could only travel in tourist
groups).  The  scheme  would  be  carried  out  in  stages  until  Guangdong’s  75  million
residents were allowed to visit Hong Kong on an individual basis starting from May 1st
2004. It was expected that the mainland tourist arrivals will hit 10 million a year when
all of Guangdong’s 75 million residents are allowed to visit Hong Kong on an individual
basis.  This  is  expected  to  bring  into  Hong  Kong  50  billion  dollars  in  consumption
expenditure per year 12.
61 Another encouraging achievement of the Joint Conference was the consensus between
the  Hong Kong government  and  the  mainland government  on  the  need  to  build  a
bridge linking Hong Kong, Zhuhai and Macau, the so-called Hong Kong, Zhuhai, Macau
Bridge. The Joint Conference also considered other aspects of co-operation covering
tourism,  technology,  culture,  transport,  intellectual  property,  trade,  disease
prevention, etc. As many as 15 sub-committees were set up to deal with these various
aspects of co-operation.
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6. Growing unemployment
NB: Figures for 2002 are preliminary estimates.
Sources : Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, various years.
62 An important  message conveyed by the  Joint  Conference is  that  both governments
would adopt a new approach in its co-operation efforts. Much stress has been made on
developing Guangdong as a manufacturing base and Hong Kong as a logistics, business
and financial centre in the PRD region. So instead of competing between themselves in
various areas, division of labour becomes the main theme. This is a break through in
thinking,  implying  that  Guangdong  and  Hong  Kong  are  no  longer  two  individual
economic territories, but both submerging into one economic zone. 
63 So the Joint Conference was of far-reaching significance. Not only had it taken a step
towards building the link between Hong Kong and western Guangdong with the bridge
proposal, it also marked the beginning of a new era in cross-border cooperation. By
announcing plans to turn the PRD region into an “economic super-zone” both Hong
Kong  and  Guangdong  would  benefit.  Guangdong  was  to  speed  up  its  economic
development while Hong Kong would achieve its economic recovery13. 
64 Hong Kong’s inflation in the early 1990s and Hong Kong’s deflation after the Asian
financial turmoil have much to do with the linked rate system. Inflation and deflation
are adjustment mechanisms for when the economy is out of line with its economic
fundamentals  but  without  the  possibility  of  revaluation  and  devaluation  of  the
currency.
65 In the early 1990s Hong Kong experienced high inflation. The two major causes for
Hong Kong’s inflation in the early 1990s were an over-heated economy and structural
change. Under the linked rate system it is not possible to revalue the HK dollar to cope
with inflation. Inflation itself, however, serves as an adjustment mechanism. Inflation
reduces Hong Kong’s competitiveness and slows down export growth. The resulting
contractionary effect on the economy slows down inflation. 
66 After the Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong experienced deflation. The two major causes
for  Hong  Kong’s  deflation  are  sluggish  demand  and  economic  integration  between
Hong Kong and mainland China.  Under the linked rate system it  is  not  possible  to
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devalue the Hong Kong dollar to cope with deflation. Deflation itself, however, serves
as  an  adjustment  mechanism.  Deflation  enables  Hong  Kong  to  regain  its
competitiveness and to achieve economic recovery. 
67 Although deflation serves as an adjustment mechanism for Hong Kong’s economy, it is
a painful process. Measures are needed to mitigate the effects of deflation. However it
is found that for Hong Kong being a small open economy the scope for macroeconomic
policies, i.e. fiscal and monetary policies is limited. 
68 A more practical approach for tackling deflation is to foster more intense economic
integration  between  Hong  Kong  and  mainland  China.  It  is hoped  that  through
participating more closely in the economic development of mainland China Hong Kong
can grasp the business opportunities available there,  especially now that China has
gained entry into the WTO. 
69 Logistics, financial services, business services and tourism have been identified as the
key  areas  where  Hong  Kong  should  concentrate  its  efforts  and  allow  resources  to
develop.  These  are  the  areas  where  Hong  Kong  can  play  important  roles  in  the
economic development of China, especially in the PRD region. It is expected that Hong
Kong can remain a major commercial and financial centre in the PRD region. 
70 There has been a fundamental change of attitude of the Chinese mainland government
with regard to the economic development in the PRD region. Instead of giving a free
hand to the Guangdong cities to compete with Hong Kong, they are now being led to co-
operate with Hong Kong closely through a greater division of labour. Hong Kong is to
position itself as a “front shop” while the Guangdong cities will position themselves as
“manufacturing  support  at  the  back”.  Hong  Kong  and  the  Guangdong  cities are
expected to make up an economic upper-zone. 
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